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Feasibility/Desirability Games
for Normal Form Games, Choice Models and
Evolutionary Games
Pierre Lescanne⋆
Universite´ de Lyon, ENS de Lyon, CNRS (LIP),
46 alle´e d’Italie, 69364 Lyon, France
Abstract. An abstraction of normal form games is proposed, called
Feasibility/Desirability Games (or FD Games in short). FD Games can
be seen from three points of view: as a new presentation of games in
which Nash equilibria can be found, as choice models in microeconomics
or as a model of evolution in games.
1 Introduction
Feasibility/Desirability Games (FD games in short) were designed by Le Roux
et al. [2006] as a fruitful abstraction of normal form games. This abstraction goes
beyond the model of matrices, used for normal forms, toward this of directed
graphs, which fits better to the true nature of the problem and yields an existence
theorem for a natural abstraction of Nash equilibrium.
On another hand, behavioral economics is based on choice correspondences
which are functions owned by decision makers and aimed to describe human
behavior. In Rubinstein [1998], Rubinstein describes the decision process as fol-
lows:
an agent ... has to chose an alternative after a process of deliberation in
which he answers three questions:
– “What is feasible’?”
– “What is desirable?”
– “What is the best alternative according to the notion of desirability,
given the feasibility constraints?”
In this article, we show that if one considers such a game as a unique decision
maker and if the relation of the game called feasible and more desirable choice
is acyclic (i.e., with no path from a node to itself), then the function that yields
the abstract Nash equilibria is a choice correspondence. We show how an actual
decision maker can be made, namely it can be implemented as a game and the
choices he makes are abstract Nash equilibria. Hence we say that a decision
maker can be constituted of many agents, which is not a surprise. Think of a
⋆ This research has been supported by Re´gion Ile de France.
decision taken by a directorate. The decision is a the rest of a compromise, i.e.,
an equilibrium.
Salant and Rubinstein [2008] give a sample of choice functions, based on
what the authors call a frame. We show that FD games are frames, in other
words, a game with agents is a good tool to simulate a decision maker. This
is also related to what Bernheim and Rangel [2007] call choice with ancillary
functions and Manzini and Mariotti [2007], Rational Shortlist Method. FD games
have also interesting connections with evolutionary games. Let us mention that
choice functions have been studied by Nehring [1997], but despite it speaks about
relations, this approach is not directly relevant with the one presented in this
paper. See also Alcantud1 and Als-Ferrer [2007] for a somewhat more restricted
extension of normal form games.
In this article, we present first in Section 2 the concept of FD game followed
by this of equilibrium: abstract Nash equilibrium (Section 3.1) and its extension
called FD-equilibrium (Section 3.2). We recall in Section 4 the notion of choice
correspondence and show its connection with FD-games. Two kinds of choice
correspondences are described in Section 5. Evolutionary games are described
as FD-games in Section 6.
2 FD games
FD games1 were conceived as extensions of strategic games (Le Roux et al.
[2008]) which intend to algebraically formalize games using the minimal set of
concepts (Occam’s Razor). They actually implement the three items of the “de-
liberation process” as presented in Rubinstein [1998, 2006], namely feasibility,
desirability, and choice of the most desirable among the feasible alternatives. Like
in strategic games, there is a set A of agents and a set S of situations2. Each
agent moves from a situation to another; but the move can occur only if it is
possible for the agent, this is what Rubinstein [1998, 2006] calls feasibility. We
write it 99Ka. To be precise, s 99Ka s
′ means that the move from s to s′ is feasible
for agent a. An agent can have a desire to go to a situation rather than staying
where he is, this is what is called desirability in Rubinstein [1998, 2006]; it is writ-
ten //a. s //a s
′ means that agent a who is in situation s desires to go in situation
s′. For instance, if the FD-game is a game in normal form and s and s′ are strat-
egy profiles, strategy profile s′ has a better payoff for him than strategy profile
s′. Hence, formally, an FD game is a 4-uple Γ = 〈A,S, (99Ka)a∈A, ( //a)a∈A〉.
Example 1. Consider the game with two agents, thin blue and fat red and four
situations (H,H), (H,T ), (T, T ), (T,H). Thin blue agent has feasibility and
desirability , fat red agent has feasibility and desirability ,
1 Under the name of CP games.
2 This corresponds to what is called a strategy profile in strategic games. Sometimes
a “situation” is called an “outcome”.
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H,H H,T
T,H T,T
H,H H,T
T,H T,T
When presented as a strategic game, this game is known asmatching pennies.
The coming example is a game which is not derived from a strategic game.
Example 2 (A quest for the wonderland). Two captains with their ships, which
are not sister ships, and their crew look for nice islands to stay. Due to the wind
and the different performances of the ships, the eight islands are not equally
accessible and some are accessible one way by a ship, but not the other way.
Similarly not all the islands are equally nice and the crew may prefer (desire)
one over the other. This is represented by the following diagrams.
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Feasibility of the journeys Desirability among islands
3 Equilibria
Let us now be a little formal.
3.1 Abstract Nash Equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which no agent can move toward a situation
he (she) desires.
Definition 1 (Abstract Nash equilibrium). An abstract Nash equilibrium
is a situation s such that: ∀a ∈ A, ∀s′ ∈ S . s 99Ka s
′ ∧ s //a s
′ =⇒ s = s′.
This is written EqaNΓ (s) (aN stands for abstract Nash).
This suggests a relation →a called feasible and more desirable choice for a
defined as
→a = 99Ka ∩ //a
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i.e. s→a s
′ if s 99Ka s
′ and s //a s
′. From these relations, one defines a relation
feasible and more desirable choice which sums up the feasible and more desirable
choice of all the agents).
→ =
⋃
a∈A
→a .
Definition 2 (Abstract Nash equilibrium, as sink). A situation s is an
abstract Nash equilibria if s is a sink3 for the feasible and more desirable choice,
i.e., if ∀s′ ∈ S, s→ s′ ⇒ s = s′.
Abstract Nash equilibria can be seen as one of the feasible most desirable choices.
Actually there is no other situation which is feasible and more desirable.
This is illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma.
Example 3 (Prisoner’s dilemma). The situations are Quits (Q) and Finks (F ).
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F, F
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F, F
The above graphs represent the feasibility (on the left) and the desirability (on
the right). Vertical arrows for feasibility represent possibilities for the first agent
to change his (her) attitude and horizontal arrows are for the second agent. The
right digram represents abstractly (i.e., without referring to payoffs that are
meaningless in that case) the desires (preferences) of the agents. Both agents
prefer (Q,Q) to (F, F ) (desire (Q,Q) more than (F, F )), but first agent prefers
(F,Q) to (F, F ), (F,Q) to (Q,F ), etc. The graphs below represent the feasible
and more desirable choice for both prisoners and the (general) feasible and more
desirable choice:
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F, F
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F ,F
Clearly F, F is a sink for and this is an abstract Nash equilibrium; this
means that there is no more desirable choice for the prisoners in this situation.
One notices that the change from (F, F ) to (Q,Q) which corresponds to a more
3 Given a relation R (or a graph) a sink is a node s such that ∀s′, s→ s′ ⇒ s = s′.
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desirable choice for both agents is not feasible due to constraints which forces
feasibility to be on horizontal or vertical lines only.
The Battle of the Sexes, also called Bach or Stravinsky or BoS (Osborne and
Rubinstein [1994], Osborne [2004]) is an example with two abstract Nash equi-
libria.
Example 4 (Battles of the Sexes). It is given by the two diagrams which describe
feasibility and desirability:
B,B B, S
S,B S, S
B,B B, S
S,B S, S
with the feasible and more desirable choice for both agents and the (general)
feasible and more desirable choice:
B,B B, S
S,B S, S
B,B B, S
S,B S ,S
There are two Nash equilibria B,B and S, S.
Example 5 (A quest for the wonderland, the choice). In Example 2 the feasible
and more desirable choice is given by the following diagram:
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It has an abstract Nash equilibrium, namely D, i.e., one the feasible most desir-
able choice.
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Actually the relation feasible and more desirable choice is the relation of
interest, but the two relations feasibility and desirability are essential for two
reasons. First they make the connection with strategic games (games in normal
forms), in particular desirability is what is called preference in strategic games
(Osborne and Rubinstein [1994]) whereas feasibility is an abstraction of the rela-
tion that allows moves only along rows, columns, heights, etc. in strategic games.
Second they are methodologically important, as they allow thinking models in
terms of two relations answering two specific questions: what is feasible? what
is desirable?
In algorithmic game theory (Daskalakis et al. [2009], Nisan et al. [2007],
Johnson [2007]), Nash equilibria are also sinks for a relation, but the definition
of a Nash equilibrium is not given as being a sink. A mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium is actually a sink for a completely different relation which is used to
find it and which has no connection with the feasible and more desirable choice.
3.2 FD equilibria
Let us recall few concepts on directed graphs and strongly connected compo-
nents.
Strongly connected components. Given a directed graph, a strongly con-
nected component (a SCC in short) is a maximal set of nodes connected in both
direction by paths4. In other words a SCC is a set of nodes of the directed graph,
which are connected by paths (sequences of arcs). Moreover this set is maximal,
which means that if one adds a node, then there is a node in the SCC which is
not connected to it or the other way around. Fig. 1 shows a graph, its decom-
position into strongly connected components and its reduced graph. Actually it
has four strongly connected components associated with •, , ⋆ and N. The
SCC’s form a graph called the reduced graph, the nodes of which are the SCC’s
and the arc of which are as follows: there is an arc from a SCC N to a SCC N ′
if there are a node n in N , a node n′ in N ′ and an arc n→ n′.
FD equilibria as SCC’s. An abstract Nash equilibrium is a sink in the graph
of the feasible and more desirable choice. We know that abstract Nash equilibria
do not exist always, but if we generalize the concept, there exists always an
equilibrium. To generalize abstract Nash equilibria, we consider the case where
the agents have reached, by the feasible and more desirable choice, some kind
of end point (end “cluster”), actually an SCC, and are unable to leave it. This
corresponds to what people call a dynamic equilibrium. Hence a natural extension
is to say that a FD equilibrium is a sink in the reduced graph, i.e. a SCC with
no out arc. The two SCC’s associated with N and ⋆ in Fig. 1 are such sinks in
the reduced graph.
4 A path is a sequence of arcs.
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•• • •
• • • •
•
•
•
 ⋆ ⋆
  ⋆ ⋆
N
N
•
 ⋆
N
A graph Its SCC’s Its reduced graph
Fig. 1. A graph, its SCC’s and, its reduced graph
Examples of FD equilibria
Example 6 (Matching pennies). The feasible and more desirable choice for the
matching pennies is given by the following diagrams.
H,H H,T
T,H T,T
H,H H,T
T,H T,T
Example 7 (Matching pennies with hidden coins). We imagine a new version of
matching pennies where players have three actions Presenting the Coin Head up
(H), Presenting the Coin Tail up (T ) or Not Presenting the Coin (N). When
both present the same side, fat red wins and thin blue loses and when they
both present different sides, thin blue wins and fat red loses. In addition, we as-
sume that when both present nothing they both win and when only one presents
nothing they both lose. The game is presented in Fig. 2. The first diagram is fea-
sibility, the second diagram is desirability5 , the third diagram is general feasible
and more desirable choice, and the fourth diagram is the reduced graph of general
feasible and more desirable choice. One notices two FD equilibria. First, (N,N)
which is also an abstract Nash equilibrium and {(H,H), (H,T ), (T,H), (T, T )}
which corresponds to a SCC made of four situations.
Example 8 (Prisoner’s dilemma with communications). Adding communication
to the prisoner’s dilemma is easy. Suppose there is a common knowledge among
5 There are two options. You can consider that the desirability is not transitive or you
can assume that the arrows that can be deduced by transitivity have been dropped.
But this difference is unimportant in what follows.
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N,N N,H N, T
H,N H,H H,T
T,N T,H T, T
N,N N,H N, T
H,N H,H H, T
T,N T,H T, T
N,N N,H N, T
H,N H,H H,T
T,N T,H T, T
N,N N,H N, T
H,N
H,H
T,H
H,T
T,T
T,N
Fig. 2. Matching pennies with hidden coins
the prisoners that if they decide to fink or cooperate they will be put in the same
cell and they will be able to communicate. In the feasibility graph this means
that one adds two arcs from F, F to Q,Q, one for each prisoner.
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F,F
and one gets the feasible and more desirable choice for both prisoners and the
general feasible and more desirable choice.
8
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F,F
Q,Q Q,F
F,Q F,F
In the last graph there is one SCC, namely {(Q,Q), (Q,F ), (F,Q), (F, F )}. This
means that the prisoners will never be able to make their mind.
Example 9 (A quest for the wonderland, the FD equilibria). In Example 2, there
are three equilibria (see Fig. 3). In some cases the wonderland is a group of
islands. Only island D is a wonderland by itself, therefore the crews can decide
to burn their ships or to sink them and stay there. Notice that both crews agree
on what a wonderland is and that the decision is made collectively as one decision
maker.
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Fig. 3. The three equilibria for the quest for the wonderland
4 Choice
Let us now look at choices. Let us write P∗(X) the set of non empty subsets of
a grand set X . A choice is a partial function C : P∗(X)→ X with the following
constraint6:
Condition κ+: C(A) ∈ A.
6 This means that the choice is consistent because it is an element of the set ; κ stands
for consistency.
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Write Dom(C), the domain of C, i.e. the set of subsets on which C is defined.
When we write C(A), we assume A ∈ Dom(C). There is another constraint on
C called condition α+ which says that C is stable on subsets.
Condition α+: If A ⊆ B and C(B) ∈ A then C(A) = C(B).
A choice correspondence, written C, is a partial function, from P∗(X) to P∗(X)
i.e. such that C : P∗(X)→ P∗(X), with the constraint:
Condition κ: C(A) ⊆ A.
This means that all the choices C(A) made by C are in A. Since C can be partial,
Dom(C) can be a strict subset of X . A set Y of subsets of X is a ∩-semi-lattice
if the intersection of two subsets in Y is in Y .
Definition 3 (∩-semi-lattice). A subset Y of P∗(X) is a ∩-semi-lattice iff
A ∈ Y and B ∈ Y implies (A ∩B) ∈ Y .
Assume Dom(C) is a ∩-semi-lattice, we can state a new condition on C.
Condition ι: If x ∈ A and x ∈ C(B) then x ∈ C(A ∩B).
In other words A ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A ∩B).
Proposition 1. If conditions κ and ι hold then C(A) ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A ∩B).
For choice correspondence, condition α+ must be changed to take into ac-
count that the function does not produce an element but produces a subset.
Condition α: If A ⊆ B, if x ∈ A and if x ∈ C(B), then x ∈ C(A).
In other words, A ⊆ B implies A ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A).
This can be rephrased as “if A ⊆ B then A∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A)”. In particular, if
C produces always a singleton i.e. C(A) = {cA}, which means that C is a choice
function, then condition α says that if x ∈ A and if x ∈ {cB} then x ∈ {cA}, in
other words if x ∈ A and if x = cB then x = cA which means exactly if cB ∈ A
then cA = cB, which is condition α
+. The following proposition can be stated.
Proposition 2. Assume Dom(C) is a ∩-semi-lattice, then
1. C satisfies condition ι implies C satisfies condition α.
2. C satisfies condition κ and condition α implies C satisfies condition ι.
Proof. For 1., if A ⊆ B then A ∩B = A, then condition ι implies condition α.
For 2., one has A∩B ⊆ B, condition κ can be rephrased as B∩C(B) = C(B)
and condition α is A ∩B ∩ C(B) ⊆ C(A ∩B) which is condition ι.
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5 Acyclic Relations as Choice Correspondences
In this section we are going to show that any relation (not necessary an order)
can be used as a choice correspondence. The only requirement is the existence of
a sink. Such a relation is naturally given by a feasible and more desirable choice.
Now we abstract the presentation of the previous sections, by considering
only the pair 〈S,→〉. One may consider S as a set of situations and → as a
feasible and more desirable choice. In other words, we forget about feasibility and
desirability for a while and retain only →. From a choice point of view, S is the
set of alternatives. A choice maker is then a combination of agents participating
in an FD game. C→ is the choice correspondence for the relation→. It associates
with A the set of sinks in A for the relation →, more precisely:
C→(A) = {s ∈ A | ∀s
′ ∈ A, s→ s′ ⇒ s = s′}.
In Fig. 4, C→(A) is made of the red triangles and the blue square and C→(B) is
made of the green circles and the blue square.
B
A

N N
• •
Fig. 4. A relation and two choice correspondences
Claim. C→ is a choice correspondence. Its domain is
Dom(C→) = {A ∈ P
∗(X) | ∃s ∈ A, ∀s′ ∈ A, s→ s′ ⇒ s = s′}.
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In other words, the domain of C→ is the set of sets which have at least a sink
situation.
Claim. If → is acyclic and B is finite and not empty then C→(B) is finite and
non empty, in other words, Dom(C→) = P
∗(X).
Proof. A finite acyclic relation has always a sink.
Claim. C→ fulfills condition κ, i.e. C→(A) ⊆ A.
Claim. If → is acyclic, then C→ fulfills condition α.
Proof. If A ⊆ B, condition ∀s ∈ B, s → s′ ⇒ s = s′ is stronger than
∀s ∈ A, s→ s′ ⇒ s = s′ hence s ∈ A and s ∈ C→(B) imply s ∈ C→(A).
This is illustrated by the diagram of Fig. 4. The blue square belongs to A and
is a sink in B then it is also a sink in A, in other words,  ∈ A and  ∈ C→(B)
implies  ∈ C→(A).
6 Evolutionary Dynamic Games
In Le Roux et al. [2008], we presented a game called Blink and you lose due to
Rene´ Vestergaard.
6.1 Blink and you lose
Blink and you lose is a game played on a simple graph with two undifferentiated
tokens. There are three positions:
?>=<89:;•• ?>=<89:; ?>=<89:;• ?>=<89:;• ?>=<89:; ?>=<89:;••
There are two players, Left and Right. The leftmost position above is the winning
position for Left and the rightmost position is the winning position for Right. In
other words, the one who owns both token is the winner. Let us call the positions
L, C, and R respectively. One plays by taking a token on the opposite node. The
game has four tactics.
A first tactic: Foresight A player realizes that she can win by taking the
opponent’s token faster than the opponent can react, i.e., player Left can convert
C into L by outpacing player Right. Player Right, in turn, can convert C into R.
This version of the game has two singleton equilibria: L and R. This is described
by the following feasibility.
L C R
desirability is
L C R
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where is the desirability for Left and is the desirability for
Right. The general feasible and more desirable choice is then:
L C R
and one sees that there are two equilibria: namely L and R, which means that
players have taken both token and keep them.
A second tactic: Hindsight A player, say Left, analyzes what would happen
if she does not act. In case Right acts, the game would end up in R and Left
loses. As we all know, people hate to lose so they have an aversion for a losing
position. Actually Left concludes that she could have prevented the R outcome
by acting. In other words, it is within Left ’s power to convert R into C. Similarly
for player Right from L to C.
L C R
We get the following general feasible and more desirable choice:
L C R
where C is a singleton equilibrium or an Abstract Nash Equilibrium.
A third tactic: Omnisight The players have both hindsight and foresight,
resulting in an FD game
L C R
with one change-of-mind equilibrium covering all outcomes thus, no singleton
equilibrium (or Abstract Nash Equilibrium) exists.
L C R
A fourth tactic: Defeatism One of the player, say Left, acknowledges that
she will be outperformed by the other (Right in this case). She is so terrified
by her opponent that she returns the token when she has it.7 This yields the
following feasibility:
L C R
We get the following general feasible and more desirable choice
L C R
where R is a singleton equilibrium or an Abstract Nash Equilibrium.
7 This strategy was not presented in Le Roux et al. [2008].
13
A B dominance
A B bistability
A B coexistence
A B neutrality
Fig. 5. Evolutionary game dynamics (after Nowak and Sigmund)
6.2 Blink and you loose and evolutionary games
Nowak and Sigmund [2004] present outcomes of evolutionary games of two strate-
gies, like in Fig. 5. They call the first outcome: dominance, (A vanishes, if B is
the best reply to both A and B), for us this is the tactic defeatism in Blink and
you loose. They call the second outcome bistability (either A or B vanishes, de-
pending on the initial mixture, if each strategy is the best response to itself), for
us this is the tactic foresight. They call the third outcome: coexistence (A and B
coexist in stable proportion, if each strategy is the best response to the other),
for us this is the tactic hindsight. They call the fourth outcome: neutrality (the
frequencies of A and B are only subject to random drift, if each strategy fares
as well as the other for any composition of the population and exhibit the same
pictures), for this corresponds to the tactic omnisight.
6.3 Evolution of FD games
FD games are a natural frame for evolution of games, especially of normal form
games. First recall that they abstract normal form games. Second they describe
accurately the process of evolution. Consider a sequence of games describing
an evolution. Suppose that at step n player a is at a situation sn. At step
n + 1, he will move, if this is possible, to a situation sn+1 he can move to
(feasible) and he wants to (desirable). Therefore he will naturally follow an arc
of the relation feasible and more desirable choice. There will be two kinds of
interesting outcomes: either at some step, players reach a situation they cannot
proceed further, this is an abstract Nash equilibrium, or players reach a strongly
14
connected component for the relation feasible and more desirable choice, in which
the move forever without being able to leave it, this is an FD equilibrium.
6.4 Matching pennies with hidden coins
One can consider the evolution of the game of Fig. 2. One sees that it can have
two evolutions, either to N,N which is an abstract Nash equilibrium or to the
SCC which is an FD-equilibrium.
H,H H, T
T,H T, T
Acknowledgment I would like to thanks Franck Delaplace, Ste´phane Le Roux
and Rene´ Vestergaard for discussions and suggestions.
7 Conclusion
This paper has shown the connection between game theory (more specially FD
game theory which covers strategic game theory) choice models and evolutionary
games, namely we have shown that if the game has only abstract Nash equilibria,
the function that yields the set of all the abstract Nash equilibria is a choice
correspondence.
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Notions on directed graphs
In this section we recall notions on relations which are also called directed ori-
ented graphs and operations on them.
Graphs or relations A directed graph or a relation R on A is a subset of A×A.
The elements of A are called the nodes of the graph and the pairs of R are
called the arcs of the graph. One writes xR y if (x, y) ∈ R.
A relation is transitive if xR y and y R z implies xRz.
A relation is reflexive if xRx for all x.
The transitive closure of a graph or of a relation R is the least relation R+
which contains R.
A directed acyclic graph is a graph such that there exists no path from x to
x, in other words, there is no x, such that xR+ x.
The transitive and reflexive closure of a relation R is the least transitive
and reflexive relation R∗ which contains R.
Why is this article published only on the arXiv?
This paper does present deep results from the mathematical point of view, like
all the papers quoted in the bibliography. Like previous ones [Le Roux et al.,
2006, Le Roux et al., 2008] it has been submitted to several journals and has been
rejected without having being actually read by any referee or editors, with only
subjective arguments. It should be interesting to know what kinds of sociological
arguments lie behind this rejection. My view is that actually scientists are reluc-
tant to new ideas and new paradigms. Thank to the arXiv system, this research
can be made available to a large community and to the future generation.
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